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Monday, August 8, 2011

Automatic Continuing Resolutions: Background and Overview of Recent Proposals


Jessica Tollestrup
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

Currently, 12 regular appropriations acts fund the activities of most federal government agencies. When these acts are not completed prior to the beginning of the fiscal year, Congress uses a continuing appropriations act, also known as a “continuing resolution” (CR), to provide interim funding until the annual appropriations process is complete.

As recently as the 112th Congress, some Members of Congress have proposed legislation to establish an automatic continuing resolution (ACR) mechanism that would ensure a source of funding for discretionary spending activities at a specified level in the event that the timely enactment of appropriations were disrupted. The funding would become available automatically at any point during the fiscal year when a funding gap occurred without any further congressional action being needed, and it would remain available for the duration of the ACR mechanism’s effectiveness.

The framework employed by ACR proposals since the early 1980s has varied along four major dimensions: whether or not the measure sunsets, the level of funding that would automatically be provided, the activities for which the funding could be used, and the duration for which the funding would be available.

Proponents of ACRs have argued that the mechanism is needed to prevent the possibility of government shutdowns and their related effects and to promote a context for funding decisions in which time pressures are less intense allowing for a more deliberative decision-making process. Further, proponents also have argued that the use of an ACR mechanism would make CRs a less attractive vehicle for unrelated legislative measures. In contrast, opponents of an ACR mechanism have posited that the enactment of an ACR would create an advantage for the current level of federal spending relative to other proposed levels during subsequent budget negotiations. Opponents have also claimed that the threat of a government shutdown causes serious negotiations and compromise to occur and by lessening or eliminating this threat, the enactment of regular appropriations would become more difficult and only lead to delay of needed budgetary legislation. A further critique has stated that an ACR mechanism would create procedural challenges under the current budget process because they would effectively establish a permanent appropriation for covered activities.

Congressional action on an ACR proposal first occurred in 1991, with hearings on H.R. 298, the Budget Process Reform Act (102nd Congress). Action also occurred with respect to ACR proposals during five subsequent Congresses, including floor votes in the House in the 105th and 106th Congresses. None of these proposals, however, were enacted.

During the 110th and 111th Congresses, a total of 10 separate ACR proposals were introduced, six in the House and four in the Senate. None of these measures received committee consideration. In addition, a proposal for an ACR was offered as a Senate floor amendment, but fell on a Budget Act point of order. In response to the delay in enacting FY2011 appropriations until after the first half of the fiscal year, ACR legislation has also been introduced in the 112th Congress.



Date of Report: August 4, 2011
Number of Pages: 20
Order Number: R41948
Price: $29.95

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