Emily C. Barbour
Legislative Attorney
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court will consider whether evidence that was seized in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is admissible at trial because the police seized the evidence in good-faith reliance on then-controlling case law. The petitioner in that case, Willie Davis, was arrested after a traffic stop. Following his arrest, the police searched the passenger compartment of the car in which he had been riding. At the time of the search, the police were acting in conformity with controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. However, after Davis was convicted and had filed an appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that this type of search incident to arrest was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Following that ruling, the Eleventh Circuit held that despite the new standard making the underlying search unconstitutional, the evidence is admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In similar cases, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits reached the same conclusion, but the Ninth Circuit has held that if a search is deemed unconstitutional under new Supreme Court precedent, the evidence seized during that search must be excluded.
When the exclusionary rule applies, the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search is suppressed at trial. The exclusionary rule is a pragmatic doctrine intended to deter Fourth Amendment violations, and it only applies when (1) there is no applicable exception to its operability, and (2) the benefits of evidentiary suppression outweigh its burdens on the justice system. The good-faith exception is one of several exceptions to the exclusionary rule’s operability. One exception to the exclusionary rule is the good-faith exception, under which unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be introduced at trial if it was seized in “good-faith.” That is, such evidence is admissible when its seizure did not constitute deliberate and culpable police misconduct.
On his appeal to the Supreme Court, Davis advanced several theories to explain why the Eleventh Circuit erred in applying the good-faith exception—rather than the exclusionary rule—to the evidence in his case. One theory is that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly weighed the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule. Namely, Davis contends that the Eleventh Circuit erred by failing to consider that the benefits of the exclusionary rule’s application included both the deterrence of unconstitutional police searches and the development of Fourth Amendment law.
Davis also argues that the exclusionary rule’s application to his case is mandated by the rule of retroactivity. This rule, also known as the retroactivity doctrine, is based in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which the Supreme Court has held requires the retroactive application of any new Fourth or Fifth Amendment decision to all cases that were not yet final when it was announced.
Congress has occasionally considered legislation codifying the exclusionary rule or its good-faith exception. The scope of Congress’s authority to enact or modify exclusionary rule jurisprudence depends on the extent to which the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the exclusionary rule as having no constitutional basis, it has firmly grounded the retroactivity doctrine in Article III of the Constitution. Accordingly, Davis presents the Supreme Court with a new opportunity to address the extent to which the exclusionary rule may—or may not—be constitutionally required.
Date of Report: April 19, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: R41774
Price: $29.95
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Legislative Attorney
In Davis v. United States, the Supreme Court will consider whether evidence that was seized in violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights is admissible at trial because the police seized the evidence in good-faith reliance on then-controlling case law. The petitioner in that case, Willie Davis, was arrested after a traffic stop. Following his arrest, the police searched the passenger compartment of the car in which he had been riding. At the time of the search, the police were acting in conformity with controlling Eleventh Circuit precedent. However, after Davis was convicted and had filed an appeal, the Supreme Court ruled that this type of search incident to arrest was unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment. Following that ruling, the Eleventh Circuit held that despite the new standard making the underlying search unconstitutional, the evidence is admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In similar cases, the Sixth and Tenth Circuits reached the same conclusion, but the Ninth Circuit has held that if a search is deemed unconstitutional under new Supreme Court precedent, the evidence seized during that search must be excluded.
When the exclusionary rule applies, the evidence obtained in an unconstitutional search is suppressed at trial. The exclusionary rule is a pragmatic doctrine intended to deter Fourth Amendment violations, and it only applies when (1) there is no applicable exception to its operability, and (2) the benefits of evidentiary suppression outweigh its burdens on the justice system. The good-faith exception is one of several exceptions to the exclusionary rule’s operability. One exception to the exclusionary rule is the good-faith exception, under which unconstitutionally obtained evidence may be introduced at trial if it was seized in “good-faith.” That is, such evidence is admissible when its seizure did not constitute deliberate and culpable police misconduct.
On his appeal to the Supreme Court, Davis advanced several theories to explain why the Eleventh Circuit erred in applying the good-faith exception—rather than the exclusionary rule—to the evidence in his case. One theory is that the Eleventh Circuit incorrectly weighed the costs and benefits of applying the exclusionary rule. Namely, Davis contends that the Eleventh Circuit erred by failing to consider that the benefits of the exclusionary rule’s application included both the deterrence of unconstitutional police searches and the development of Fourth Amendment law.
Davis also argues that the exclusionary rule’s application to his case is mandated by the rule of retroactivity. This rule, also known as the retroactivity doctrine, is based in Article III of the U.S. Constitution, which the Supreme Court has held requires the retroactive application of any new Fourth or Fifth Amendment decision to all cases that were not yet final when it was announced.
Congress has occasionally considered legislation codifying the exclusionary rule or its good-faith exception. The scope of Congress’s authority to enact or modify exclusionary rule jurisprudence depends on the extent to which the exclusionary rule is constitutionally required. Although the Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the exclusionary rule as having no constitutional basis, it has firmly grounded the retroactivity doctrine in Article III of the Constitution. Accordingly, Davis presents the Supreme Court with a new opportunity to address the extent to which the exclusionary rule may—or may not—be constitutionally required.
Date of Report: April 19, 2011
Number of Pages: 12
Order Number: R41774
Price: $29.95
Follow us on TWITTER at http://www.twitter.com/alertsPHP or #CRSreports
Document available via e-mail as a pdf file or in paper form.
To order, e-mail Penny Hill Press or call us at 301-253-0881. Provide a Visa, MasterCard, American Express, or Discover card number, expiration date, and name on the card. Indicate whether you want e-mail or postal delivery. Phone orders are preferred and receive priority processing.