Congressional Oversight of Intelligence: Current Structure and Alternatives

Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government

Interest in congressional oversight of intelligence has risen again in Congresses, in part because of disputes over reporting to Congress by intelligence community (IC) components on sensitive matters, including developments generated by the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. The changes in the oversight structure adopted or proposed in the 110th and 111th Congresses, however, reflect earlier concerns. For instance, the House Democratic majority had pledged in the 110th Congress to enact the remaining recommendations from the U.S. National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, commonly known as the 9/11 Commission. Its unanimous 2004 report set the stage for a reconsideration of congressional oversight, concluding that it was "dysfunctional." The commission proposed two distinct solutions: (1) creation of a joint committee on intelligence (JCI), modeled after the defunct Joint Committee on Atomic Energy (JCAE), with authority to report legislation to each chamber; or (2) enhanced status and power for the existing select committees on intelligence, by making them standing committees and granting each one both authorization and appropriations power. A follow-up effort in 2010, headed by the co-chairs of the 9/11 Commission, observed that although "some progress has been made" in overseeing intelligence, the related field of homeland security reflected a "jurisdictional melee" among "fractured and overlapping jurisdictions .... [contributing to] an unworkable system." Another 2010 study—by the Commission on WMD—concluded that Congress has been slow "to reform itself" and that "congressional oversight remains dysfunctional." 

Proposals to create a joint committee on intelligence date to 1948 and the early years of the Cold War, when the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) were established. Similar plans have emerged in the meantime, although the lion's share were made before separate Intelligence Committees were established in the House (1977) and Senate (1976). The numerous proposals for a JCI, which would end the two existing intelligence panels, moreover, vary and raise competing viewpoints over practical matters and matters of principle. 

Although it did not adopt either of the 9/11 Commission proposals, Congress has pursued other initiatives to change its intelligence oversight structure and capabilities in the 110th and 111th Congresses. The House altered its arrangements in 2007 (via H.Res. 35, 110th Congress), when it created an advisory Select Intelligence Oversight Panel on the Appropriations Committee, a hybrid structure that combines members of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations. The Senate has also changed its relationship between appropriations and intelligence. Other proposals have been considered, either in the 111th Congress or before. These include clarifying the independent audit authority of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) over the intelligence community, particularly the CIA; increasing the coordinative capabilities and reporting of relevant inspectors general (IGs); changing IC reporting requirements to Congress; and adding a new statutory IG covering the entire intelligence community and others for certain Defense Department entities. Several proposals in the FY 2010 Intelligence Authorization Act (H.R. 2701 and S. 1494, 111th Congress)—for example, dealing with congressional notification and GAO—have generated opposition from the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the possibility of a presidential veto. 

This report first describes the Select Committees on Intelligence and then the former Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, often cited as a model for a counterpart on intelligence. The study also sets forth proposed characteristics for a joint committee on intelligence, differences among these, and their pros and cons. The report examines other actions and alternatives affecting congressional oversight in the field.


Date of Report: March 29, 2010
Number of Pages: 34
Order Number: RL32525
Price: $29.95

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