Coordinated Party Expenditures in Federal Elections: An Overview

R. Sam Garrett
Analyst in American National Government

L. Paige Whitaker
Legislative Attorney

A provision of federal campaign finance law, codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441a(d), allows political party committees to make expenditures on behalf of their general election candidates for federal office and specifies limits on such spending. These "coordinated party expenditures" are important not only because they provide financial support to campaigns, but also because parties and campaigns may explicitly discuss how the money is spent. Although they have long been the major source of direct party financial support for campaigns, coordinated expenditures have recently been overshadowed by independent expenditures. 

At least thus far, coordinated party expenditures were the subject of more legislative action during the 110th Congress than during the 111th Congress. During the 111th Congress, three bills that propose to publicly finance congressional campaigns would restrict coordinated party expenditures. These include H.R. 1826 (Larson), H.R. 2056 (Tierney), and S. 752 (Durbin). By contrast, in the 110th Congress, the House and Senate considered legislation devoted primarily to coordinated party expenditures. S. 1091 (Corker) and H.R. 3792 (Wamp) would have eliminated existing caps on coordinated party expenditures. Neither bill became law. Additional legislative activity is possible during the 111th Congress. 

Those who support existing limits on coordinated party expenditures argue that the caps reduce potential corruption and the amount of money in politics. Opponents maintain that they are antiquated, particularly because political parties may make unlimited independent expenditures supporting their candidates. If the caps were lifted and fundraising patterns remained consistent with those discussed here, it appears that neither party would have a substantial resource advantage over the other. It is important to note, however, that individual circumstances would determine particular fundraising and spending decisions.


Date of Report: March 25, 2010
Number of Pages: 10
Order Number: RS22644
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The Magnitude of Changes That Would Be Required to Balance the FY2011 Budget

Marc Labonte
Specialist in Macroeconomic Policy

A balanced federal budget is a bipartisan goal of many Members of Congress. In addition, moving the budget closer to balance is a long-term necessity because the national debt cannot grow as a percentage of GDP indefinitely, as it would under current policy. The budget deficit in FY2011 is projected to be between $980 billion and $1.27 trillion. Mathematically, the budget could be balanced by reducing total spending by 28%-35%, or mandatory spending by 47%-57%, or discretionary spending by 70%-87%, or by raising income tax rates by 76%-110%. Since nonmilitary discretionary spending is projected to be less than the total budget deficit in FY2011, the budget could not be balanced solely through reductions in this category of spending. The budget is unlikely to return to balance "on its own," as some have suggested, because higher growth rates should be incorporated in the projections; research suggests that the revenue estimates of tax cuts are unlikely to be significantly overstated; and the decline in the deficit found in the CBO baseline for FY2010 to FY2014, or in the President's budget for FY2011 to FY2014, rests on assumptions that differ substantially from what is typically thought of as current policy.


Date of Report: March 12, 2010
Number of Pages: 8
Order Number: RS21939
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Executive Orders: Issuance and Revocation

Vanessa K. Burrows
Legislative Attorney

Executive orders and proclamations are used extensively by Presidents to achieve policy goals, set uniform standards for managing the executive branch, or outline a policy view intended to influence the behavior of private citizens. The Constitution does not define these presidential instruments and does not explicitly vest the President with the authority to issue them. Nonetheless, such orders are accepted as an inherent aspect of presidential power, and, if based on appropriate authority, they have the force and effect of law. This report discusses the nature of executive orders and proclamations, with a focus on the scope of presidential authority to execute such instruments and judicial and congressional responses thereto. 

In the 111th Congress, several bills have been introduced regarding the revocation and modification of executive orders: H.R. 35, H.R. 500/S. 237, H.R. 603, H.R. 1228, H.R. 3465, H.R. 4453, and S. 2929. Other bills on executive orders proposed in this Congress are prescriptive and contain provisions that do not necessarily revoke or require alteration of executive orders: H.R. 21, H.R. 292, H.R. 669, H.R. 1082, H.R. 1367, H.R. 3293, S. 237, and S. 2929. In some cases, these bills may expand upon existing executive orders. 

The 111th Congress has also passed several laws with provisions related to existing executive orders: P.L. 111-5, the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA); P.L. 111-8, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009; P.L. 111-80, the Agriculture, Rural Development, Food and Drug Administration, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 2010; and P.L. 111-117, the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010. Additionally, President Obama has issued an executive order titled Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act's Consistency with Longstanding Restrictions on the Use of Federal Funds for Abortion, which was discussed during the House floor debate on H.R. 3590/P.L. 111-148.


Date of Report: March 25, 2010
Number of Pages: 11
Order Number: RS20846
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FY2011 Budget Documents: Internet and GPO Availability

ennifer Teefy
Information Research Specialist

Every year, the President submits to Congress a series of volumes containing the President's proposed budget for the coming fiscal year. By law, the proposal is due by the first Monday in February. Neither the Congressional Research Service (CRS) nor the Library of Congress can provide distribution copies of budget documents. This report provides brief descriptions of the budget volumes and related documents, together with Internet addresses, Government Printing Office (GPO) stock numbers, and prices to obtain these publications. It also tells how to find locations of government depository libraries, which can provide both printed copies for reference use and Internet access to the text.


Date of Report: March 26, 2010
Number of Pages: 9
Order Number: R41095
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A Federal Sunset Commission: Review of Proposals and Actions

Virginia A. McMurtry
Specialist in American National Government

The sunset concept provides for programs and agencies to terminate automatically on a periodic basis unless explicitly renewed by law. In the last 12 years bills to create a federal sunset commission, modeled on the sunset review process in Texas, have been introduced in each Congress (including H.R. 393 in the 111th Congress). 

Former President George W. Bush called for creation of a federal sunset commission in his FY2006 budget submission. Bills reflecting an Office of Management and Budget (OMB) draft proposal were introduced in the 109th Congress (S. 1399, H.R. 3276, H.R. 3277). On July 20, 2006, the Committee on Government Reform voted to report H.R. 3282 favorably to the House, along with a related program review bill, H.R. 5766, as amended. Floor action had been scheduled for June 27, 2006, but was postponed, and no further action occurred on the bills. 

In the 110th Congress, with the budget submissions for FY2008 and FY2009, President Bush reaffirmed his support for passage of the Administration's proposal to create a federal sunset commission. In addition to the Brady bill (H.R. 5794), a new sunset measure, S. 1731, was introduced on June 28, 2007, by Senator John Cornyn. 

In the 111th Congress, Representative Brady reintroduced his bill as H.R. 393, the Federal Sunset Act of 2009, on January 9, 2009. Senator Cornyn introduced his measure, S. 926, the United States Authorization and Sunset Commission Act of 2009, on April 29, 2009. Provisions very similar to those in H.R. 393 also were found as a separate title in three budget reform bills introduced in the House, during the first session of the 111th Congress, including H.R. 311 (Title II), H.R. 534 (Title I), and H.R. 3964 (Title IV, Subtitle A). The Congressional Budget Resolution for FY 2010, S.Con.Res. 13, as passed by the Senate, provided for the establishment of a deficit reduction reserve fund for the bipartisan congressional sunset commission, but the sunset fund provision was not retained in the conference version of S.Con.Res. 13, as approved by both chambers. 

Supporters of sunset commission measures suggest that there are too many overlapping and ineffective federal programs that contribute to the growing federal deficit, and that the existing structure of congressional committees does not encourage systematic review of similar agencies and programs. According to sunset proponents, congressional reviews of many programs are sporadic and inadequate, as evidenced by the number of unauthorized appropriations. An action forcing mechanism—such as threat of termination—is necessary; a sunset commission would assist Congress in performing its oversight function, thereby reducing fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Critics of the sunset commission measures counter that such bills would burden Congress with a tremendous workload for mandatory reauthorization of agencies and programs. Consequently, such measures may prove infeasible to carry out, or alternatively, result in perfunctory reviews. Sunset commissions might increase congressional personnel costs, since additional staff would be needed to assist the commission in its review activities. Opponents further contend that the review and reauthorization process would pose a special threat to certain kinds of programs, such as those which provide a safety net for the most vulnerable in society.


Date of Report: March 12, 2010
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: RL34551
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Filibusters and Cloture in the Senate

Richard S. Beth
Specialist on Congress and the Legislative Process

Valerie Heitshusen
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

Betsy Palmer
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

The filibuster is widely viewed as one of the Senate's most characteristic procedural features. Filibustering includes any use of dilatory or obstructive tactics to block a measure by preventing it from coming to a vote. The possibility of filibusters exists because Senate rules place few limits on Senators' rights and opportunities in the legislative process. 

In particular, a Senator who seeks recognition usually has a right to the floor if no other Senator is speaking, and then may speak for as long as he or she wishes. Also, there is no motion by which a simple majority of the Senate can stop a debate and allow the Senate to vote in favor of an amendment, a bill or resolution, or any other debatable question. Almost every bill, indeed, is potentially subject to two filibusters before the Senate votes on whether to pass it: first, a filibuster on a motion to proceed to the bill's consideration; and second, after the Senate agrees to this motion, a filibuster on the bill itself. 

Senate Rule XXII, however, known as the "cloture rule," enables Senators to end a filibuster on any debatable matter the Senate is considering. Sixteen Senators initiate this process by presenting a motion to end the debate. The Senate does not vote on this cloture motion until the second day of session after the motion is made. Then, for most matters, it requires the votes of at least three-fifths of all Senators (normally 60 votes) to invoke cloture. (Invoking cloture on a proposal to amend the Senate's standing rules requires the support of two-thirds of the Senators present and voting.) 

The primary effect of invoking cloture on a question is to impose a maximum of 30 additional hours for considering that question. This 30-hour period for consideration encompasses all time consumed by roll call votes, quorum calls, and other actions, as well as the time used for debate. During this 30-hour period, in general, no Senator may speak for more than one hour (although several Senators can have additional time yielded to them). Under cloture, as well, the only amendments that Senators can offer are amendments that are germane and that were submitted in writing before the cloture vote took place. Finally, the presiding officer also enjoys certain additional powers under cloture: for example, to count to determine whether a quorum is present, and to rule amendments, motions, and other actions out of order on the grounds that they are dilatory. 

The ability of Senators to engage in filibusters has a profound and pervasive effect on how the Senate conducts its business on the floor. In the face of a threatened filibuster, for example, the majority leader may decide not to call a bill up for floor consideration, or to defer calling it up if there are other, equally important bills that the Senate can consider and pass without undue delay. Similarly, the prospect of a filibuster can persuade a bill's proponents to accept changes in the bill that they do not support, but that are necessary to prevent an actual filibuster.


Date of Report: March 12, 2010
Number of Pages: 25
Order Number: RL30360
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The U.S. Postal Service’s Financial Condition: Overview and Issues for Congress

Kevin R. Kosar
Analyst in American National Government

This report provides an overview of the U.S. Postal Service's (USPS's) financial condition, recent legislation to alleviate the USPS's financial challenges, and possible issues for the 111th Congress. 

Since 1971, the USPS has been a self-supporting government agency that covers its operating costs with revenues generated through the sales of postage and related products and services. 

Recently, the USPS has experienced significant financial challenges. After running modest profits from FY2004 through FY2006, the USPS lost $5.3 billion in FY2007 and $2.8 billion in FY2008. In May 2009, the USPS warned that it might experience a cash shortage at the end of September 2009. Two months later, the Government Accountability Office added the USPS's financial condition "to the list of high-risk areas needing attention by the Congress and the executive branch." 

On September 30, 2009, Congress enacted H.R. 2918, the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act [of] 2010. President Barack Obama signed the bill into law (P.L. 111-68) the next day. Section 164 of the law alleviated the USPS's cash shortage by reducing the USPS's statutorily required September 30, 2009, payment to the Postal Service Retiree Health Benefits Fund from $5.4 billion to $1.4 billion. (The USPS must repay the $4 billion deferred obligation after FY2016.) 

While Congress alleviated the USPS's FY2009 cash shortage, it is unclear what the future holds for the USPS's finances. Even with this assistance, the USPS had an FY2009 operating loss of $3.8 billion and a $297 million loss in the first quarter of FY2010. The USPS's auditor has stated that there is "significant uncertainty" as to whether the USPS will have the cash required to make its FY2010 payment to its Retiree Health Benefits Fund. 

A number of ideas for incremental reforms have been put forth that would improve the USPS's financial condition in the short term so that it might continue as a self-funding government agency, all of which would require Congress to amend current postal law. The ideas include (1) increasing the USPS's revenues by altering postage rates and increasing its offering of nonpostal rates and services; and (2) reducing the USPS's expenses by a number of means, such as recalculating the USPS's retiree health care and pension obligations and payments, closing postal facilities, and reducing mail delivery from six to five days.


Date of Report: March 17, 2010
Number of Pages: 16
Order Number: R41024
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Waste, Fraud, and Abuse in Agency Travel Card Programs

Garrett Hatch
Analyst in American National Government

Since the enactment of the Travel and Transportation Reform Act (TTRA) of 1998 (P.L. 105- 264), which required federal employees to use travel charge cards to pay for the expenses of official government travel, the dollar volume of travel card transactions has increased significantly, growing from $4.39 billion in FY1999 to $8.93 billion in FY2009. While the purpose of mandating the use of travel cards was to reduce costs and improve managerial oversight of employee travel expenditures, audits of agency travel card programs conducted since the enactment of the TTRA have found varying degrees of waste, fraud, and abuse at a number of agencies. These findings indicated systemic weaknesses in agency travel card management policies and practices—collectively referred to as internal controls—that cost the government millions of dollars annually. 

Among some of the more egregious examples of card misuse identified by auditors are a Federal Aviation Administration employee who charged $3,700 for laser eye surgery to his travel card, a Department of Defense employee who requested and received reimbursements for 13 airline tickets totaling almost $10,000 that he did not purchase, and a Department of State employee who took an unauthorized trip to Hawaii on a first-class ticket. Auditors also determined that certain agencies have not collected reimbursement for millions of dollars worth of unused airline tickets, have repeatedly failed to pay their travel card invoices in a timely manner, and have permitted or failed to prevent abuse of premium-class travel privileges. 

In response to these findings, Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation that would enhance travel card management and oversight. In addition, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has issued government-wide guidance that requires agencies to implement internal controls that are designed to minimize the risk of travel card misuse. This report begins by discussing the structure of agency travel card programs, and then discusses weaknesses in agency controls that have contributed to waste, fraud, and abuse. It then examines relevant legislation introduced or enacted in the 111th Congress, including the Government Charge Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2009 (H.R. 2189 and S. 942), and concludes with observations on the information available to Congress for oversight of agency travel card programs.


Date of Report: March 15, 2010
Number of Pages: 15
Order Number: R40580
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Federal Complaint-Handling, Ombudsman, and Advocacy Offices

Wendy R. Ginsberg
Analyst in Government Organization and Management

Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government

Federal complaint-handling, ombudsman, and advocacy offices have different forms, capacities, and designations. This report, which reviews the state of research in this field and the heritage of such offices, examines and compares them, along with recent legislative developments and past proposals to establish a government-wide ombudsman. In so doing, the report identifies the basic characteristics of these offices, recognizing differences among them with regard to their powers, duties, jurisdictions, locations, and resources, as well as control over them. This study covers only ombudsman-like offices at the federal level that deal with the public, sometimes known as "external ombudsmen." It does not cover "internal ombudsmen," that is, offices created to handle complaints from employees and resolve disputes between them and management; ombudsmanlike offices in the private sector; or similar entities at other levels of government in the United States or abroad, except to note differences among them. 

Legislative interest, albeit sporadic, in establishing a government-wide ombudsman or standardizing individual offices across-the-board dates to the early 1960s. These efforts extended in the 1970s to proposals to establish an independent office of consumer representation or consumer affairs, a plan that President Jimmy Carter later endorsed. Another initiative emerged in 1993, when President William Clinton—through an executive order "Setting Customer Service Standards"—directed executive departments and agencies to make information, service, and complaint-systems easily accessible and provide means to address such complaints. The order also called for agencies to set customer service standards, survey customers, report to the President on those surveys, and publish customer service plans. A subsequent government-wide customer satisfaction survey, incidentally, found a similar range of satisfaction between the private and public sectors. 

Notwithstanding these efforts over the past five decades, no comprehensive, across-the-board transformations have occurred. Nonetheless, numerous individual offices have been established, modified, and proposed by administrative directives, public laws, and congressional bills. This piecemeal approach—reflecting different demands in both the government and society over time and across policy areas—has resulted in a variety of ombudsman-like offices. Although a complete, authoritative identification and description of current offices does not exist, a number of studies—from past and contemporary eras, along with the examples here—provide a wide sampling of complaint-handling and advocacy offices for examination and consideration as models. 

This report consists of three parts: (1) an analysis of the ombudsman concept and a brief look at which countries around the world have used ombudsmen; (2) a breakdown of the various ways in which federal complaint-handling offices differ; and (3) an identification and description of selected ombudsman-like offices, including specifics on their origins and operations.


Date of Report: March 18, 2010
Number of Pages: 51
Order Number: RL34606
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How Agencies Monetize “Statistical Lives” Expected to Be Saved By Regulations

Curtis W. Copeland
Specialist in American National Government

Federal health, safety, and environmental regulations are often designed to reduce the risk of death, illness, or injury from exposure to a particular hazard (e.g., arsenic in drinking water or rollover car crashes). As part of an economic analysis required by Executive Order 12866, the issuing agencies often place a monetary value on these expected health benefits by determining the number of "statistical lives" that the rules are expected to extend or save, and then multiplying that number by an estimated "value of a statistical life" (VSL). For example, if 100,000 people are each willing to pay an average of $50 to reduce a 1 in 100,000 risk of dying from a particular risk, then the VSL for the population relative to that risk is $5 million ($50 times 100,000). 

The monetization of regulatory health benefits is often controversial, and the process by which federal agencies do so is not widely understood. This report summarizes current government wide requirements for benefit-cost analysis and the monetization of health benefits, and describes agency-specific policies in selected health, safety, and environmental agencies. Also, the report provides examples of final rules published by the selected agencies from 2007 through 2009 that monetized expected health benefits and describes how those values were used in the economic analyses for the rules. Finally, the report offers some concluding observations. 

OMB Circular A-4, which was issued in September 2003, delineates what is expected in a good regulatory analysis while giving the agencies substantial flexibility. The circular notes that academic studies have identified VSLs from $1 million to $10 million, but it does not recommend that agencies use a particular VSL. Circular A-4 says that VSLs should not vary by age, but recommends that agencies consider providing estimates in terms of both VSLs and the value of statistical life years (VSLY) extended. The circular says that agencies should use larger VSLYs for senior citizens, but does not specify how much larger or what constitutes a "senior citizen." When the benefits and costs of a rule are expected to occur at different times, the circular says agencies should compare them in "present values" using both a 3% and a 7% discount rate. 

Some federal agencies have written policies on the monetization of expected health benefits, and those policies differ in some respects. For example, in 2009, the Department of Transportation's (DOT) VSL was $6.0 million while the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) VSL was nearly $7.9 million. Other agencies tended to use the DOT or EPA VSLs, or used VSLs that they or other agencies have used in previous rules. DOT's policy established the value of injuries prevented as percentages of the VSL, whereas EPA's policy does not recommend particular values for injuries or illnesses. 

In more than 20 final rules that were issued between 2007 and 2009, federal agencies used somewhat different VSLs, and used VSL information in different ways. The agencies often compared monetized health benefits with costs to determine whether to regulate, but in some cases the agencies used VSL estimates in "break-even" analyses (showing at what point the value of the health benefits equal the cost), or to rule out a regulatory option. The agencies sometimes used lower and higher VSLs, and sometimes used multiple discount rates, in sensitivity analyses. Some of the rules illustrated that the size of the VSL used can affect whether a rule is expected to produce positive net benefits. Some of the apparent variations in the agencies' economic analyses may be due to differences in the degree to which the agencies disclosed their procedures.


Date of Report: March 24, 2010
Number of Pages: 44
Order Number: R41140
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The Budget Reconciliation Process: The Senate’s “Byrd Rule”

Robert Keith
Specialist in American National Government

Reconciliation is a procedure under the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 by which Congress implements budget resolution policies affecting mainly permanent spending and revenue programs. The principal focus in the reconciliation process has been deficit reduction, but in some years reconciliation has involved revenue reduction generally and spending increases in selected areas. Although reconciliation is an optional procedure, it has been used most years since its first use in 1980 (19 reconciliation bills have been enacted into law and three have been vetoed). 

During the first several years' experience with reconciliation, the legislation contained many provisions that were extraneous to the purpose of implementing budget resolution policies. The reconciliation submissions of committees included such things as provisions that had no budgetary effect, that increased spending or reduced revenues when the reconciliation instructions called for reduced spending or increased revenues, or that violated another committee's jurisdiction. 

In 1985 and 1986, the Senate adopted the Byrd rule (named after its principal sponsor, Senator Robert C. Byrd) on a temporary basis as a means of curbing these practices. The Byrd rule has been extended and modified several times over the years. In 1990, the Byrd rule was incorporated into the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 as Section 313 and made permanent (2 U.S.C. 644). 

A Senator opposed to the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation may offer an amendment (or a motion to recommit the measure with instructions) that strikes such provisions from the legislation, or, under the Byrd rule, a Senator may raise a point of order against such matter. In general, a point of order authorized under the Byrd rule may be raised in order to strike extraneous matter already in the bill as reported or discharged (or in the conference report), or to prevent the incorporation of extraneous matter through the adoption of amendments or motions. A motion to waive the Byrd rule, or to sustain an appeal of the ruling of the chair on a point of order raised under the Byrd rule, requires the affirmative vote of three-fifths of the membership (60 Senators if no seats are vacant). 

The Byrd rule provides six definitions of what constitutes extraneous matter for purposes of the rule (and several exceptions thereto), but the term is generally described as covering provisions unrelated to achieving the goals of the reconciliation instructions. 

The Byrd rule has applied to 17 reconciliation measures considered by the Senate from 1985 through the present. There have been 54 points of order and 43 waiver motions considered and disposed of under the Byrd rule, largely in a manner that favored those who opposed the inclusion of extraneous matter in reconciliation legislation (44 points of order were sustained, in whole or in part, and 34 waiver motions were rejected).


Date of Report: March 17, 2010
Number of Pages: 35
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Hearings in the U.S. Senate: A Guide for Preparation and Procedure

Betsy Palmer
Analyst on Congress and the Legislative Process

Congressional hearings are the principal formal method by which committees collect and analyze information during the legislative policymaking process. Whether confirmation hearings—a procedure unique to the Senate—legislative, oversight, investigative, or a combination of these, all hearings share common elements of preparation and conduct. 

Senate Rule XXVI sets forth many of the hearing regulations to which committees must conform, including the quorum requirement, advance submission of witness statements, the opportunity for minority party Senators to call witnesses of their choosing, and procedures for closing a hearing to the public. Senate committees, guided mainly by their chairmen, have broad discretion in how they conduct a hearing, in part because the committees adopt their own rules of procedure. These rules may supplement Senate rules, but they can not contravene them. Committee customs and leadership style not embodied in rules also vary considerably among committees and influence hearing procedures. 

Committee members and staff usually plan extensively for hearings. Early planning activities commonly include collecting background information; preparing a preliminary hearing memorandum for the chair and members; discussing the scope of the hearing and the expected outcome; scheduling and providing public notice of a hearing; selecting witnesses; determining the order and format of their testimony; and preparing questions or talking points for committee members to use in questioning witnesses. Other considerations include preparing briefing books, determining whether the hearing will be broadcast and alerting the media, and attending to the many administrative arrangements, such as reserving a hearing room, scheduling a hearing reporter, and arranging for there to be a video or audio recording of the proceeding or a written transcript that will be available to the public soon after the event. 

On the day of the hearing, a committee needs a quorum to proceed with testimony. While the vast majority of hearings are open to the public, a committee can vote to close a hearing for specific reasons stated in Senate rules. Senators typically make opening statements at the beginning of a hearing, then witnesses are introduced and may be sworn by the chair. Witnesses present oral testimony in accordance with an arranged format; this testimony generally is a summary of a written statement submitted in advance. The question and answer period that follows is an opportunity for a committee to expand upon a witness's statement and gather information to support future actions. 

Following a day of hearings, committee staff may prepare a summary of testimony, draft additional questions for the day's witnesses, and begin initial preparation of the transcript for printing. While not required, hearing transcripts commonly are printed, along with additional materials approved by the committee.


Date of Report: March 18, 2010
Number of Pages: 25
Order Number: RL30548
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Federal Funding of Presidential Nominating Conventions: Overview and Policy Options

R. Sam Garrett
Analyst in American National Government

Shawn Reese
Analyst in Emergency Management and Homeland Security Policy

This report provides an overview and analysis of two recurring questions surrounding the federal government's role in financing presidential nominating conventions. First, how much public funding supports presidential nominating conventions? Second, what options exist for changing that amount if Congress chooses to do so? Both issues have generated controversy in the past and continue to be the subject of debate. Four bills introduced in the 110th Congress proposed changes to the structure or amounts of federal funds for presidential nominating conventions. Those bills (H.R. 72, H.R. 484, S. 436, and S. 2412) would have affected Presidential Election Campaign Fund (PECF) convention grants. (Two other bills, H.R. 776 and H.R. 4294, would have affected nonfederal convention funds.) In the 111th Congress, H.R. 2992 proposes to eliminate public funding for presidential nominating conventions, although this measure does not appear to affect separate security funding discussed in this report. As of this writing, there has been no major legislative activity on the presidential public financing program—including with respect to convention funding. 

The 110th Congress enacted one law (P.L. 110-161) in FY2008 that affected convention security funding with the appropriation of $100 million for the Democratic and Republican nominating conventions (each was allocated $50 million). This security funding was not provided to party convention committees but to the state and local law enforcement entities assisting in securing the convention sites. The Administration's FY2011 budget request proposed $20 million for a National Special Security Event State and Local Reimbursement Fund (NSSE Fund). The NSSE Fund would reimburse state and local governments for costs incurred when providing security at NSSEs, such as presidential nominating conventions. 

A total of approximately $133.6 million in federal funds supported the 2008 Democratic and Republican conventions. Such funding was provided through separate federal programs that support public financing of presidential campaigns and convention security. Some Members of Congress and others have objected to federal convention funding and have argued that the events should be entirely self-supporting. Others, however, contend that public funding is necessary to avoid real or apparent corruption in this aspect of the presidential nominating process. If Congress decides to revisit convention financing, a variety of policy options discussed in this report might present alternatives to current funding arrangements. 

Additional discussion of public financing of presidential campaigns appears in CRS Report RL34534, Public Financing of Presidential Campaigns: Overview and Analysis, by R. Sam Garrett. For additional information on National Special Security Events, which include presidential nominating conventions, see CRS Report RS22754, National Special Security Events, by Shawn Reese.


Date of Report: March 18, 2010
Number of Pages: 17
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The Congressional Research Service and the American Legislative Process

Ida A. Brudnick
Analyst on the Congress

The Library of Congress, as its name suggests, is a library dedicated to serving the United States Congress and its Members. It serves additionally as an unexcelled national library. The Library was located in the Capitol Building with the House of Representatives and the Senate until 1897, and its collections always have been available for use by Congress. Building upon a concept developed by the New York State Library and then the Wisconsin legislative reference department, Wisconsin's Senator Robert LaFollette and Representative John M. Nelson led an effort to direct the establishment of a special reference unit within the Library in 1914. Later known as the Legislative Reference Service, it was charged with responding to congressional requests for information. For more than 50 years, this department assisted Congress primarily by providing facts and publications and by transmitting research and analysis done largely by other government agencies, private organizations, and individual scholars. In 1970, Congress enacted a law transforming the Legislative Reference Service into the Congressional Research Service (CRS) and directing CRS to devote more of its efforts and increased resources to performing research and analysis that assists Congress in direct support of the legislative process. 

Joined today by two other congressional support agencies, the Congressional Budget Office and the Government Accountability Office, the Congressional Research Service offers research and analysis to Congress on all current and emerging issues of national policy. CRS analysts work exclusively for Congress, providing assistance in the form of reports, memoranda, customized briefings, seminars, digitally recorded presentations, information obtained from automated data bases, and consultations in person and by telephone. This work is governed by requirements for confidentiality, timeliness, accuracy, objectivity, balance, and nonpartisanship.


Date of Report: March 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 12
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Statutory Qualifications for Executive Branch Positions

Henry B. Hogue
Analyst in American National Government

In the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, some Members of Congress and others questioned the competence of leadership at the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). After investigating the federal response to the hurricane, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs concluded that the agency's leader had "lacked the leadership skills that were needed for his critical position." In response, the Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 (P.L. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1394) stipulated that the FEMA Administrator, among other top agency leaders, must meet certain qualifications. President George W. Bush's signing statement for this act seemingly challenged the constitutionality of these requirements, and it stated that the "executive branch shall construe [the applicable provision] in a manner consistent with the Appointments Clause of the Constitution." Three Members of Congress then urged the President to "reconsider [his] position and join [them] in calling for strong standards and the highest professional qualifications for the leadership of FEMA and for open dialogue between the executive and legislative branches on issues of such significant importance to out nation's safety and security." 

These events reflect broader interbranch differences over congressional authority to establish statutory qualifications. The preponderance of evidence and historical practice suggests that Congress generally has the constitutional authority to set such qualifications. The boundaries of this authority have not been conclusively drawn, however, and the executive branch, in recent years, has asserted that congressional authority in this area is more limited than congressional practice would suggest. Statutory qualification requirements might continue to be an area of conflict between Congress and the President. Inasmuch as these provisions are not self-enforcing, their success as a means of assuring competent leadership of the federal government will depend upon the two branches' adherence to them during the selection and confirmation processes. 

In practice, it has not been unusual for Congress to mandate that appointees to certain positions meet specified requirements. Some statutory qualification provisions, like those for the FEMA Administrator, require that appointees have certain experience, skills, or educational backgrounds that are associated with competence. Other qualification provisions address a variety of characteristics, such as citizenship status, residency, or, for the purpose of maintaining political balance on regulatory boards, political party affiliation. Congress has used such statutory provisions selectively; most executive branch positions do not have them. This report provides background on the constitutional appointments framework, discusses Congress's constitutional authority to set qualifications, discusses congressional practices in this area, and provides related analysis and options. The report includes two tables with examples of existing positions with qualification requirements.


Date of Report: March 16, 2010
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Interim Continuing Resolutions (CRs): Potential Impacts on Agency Operations

Clinton T. Brass
Analyst in Government Organization and Management

Continuing appropriations acts, often known as continuing resolutions (CRs), have been a component of the annual appropriations process for decades. When Congress and the President do not reach final decisions about one or more regular appropriations acts by the beginning of the federal fiscal year, October 1, they often enact a CR. Two general types of CRs are used. An "interim" CR provides agencies with stopgap funding for a period of time until final appropriations decisions are made, or until enactment of another interim CR. A "full-year" CR provides final funding amounts for the remainder of a fiscal year in lieu of one or more regular appropriations acts. "Anomalies" may be included in an interim CR to prevent what parties to CR negotiations perceive as major problems that would be caused if an otherwise uniform approach were used to provide funding and impose related restrictions. The President, Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and agencies often are involved with Congress in the process of formulating, negotiating, and implementing interim CRs. An implication of their involvement is that they may influence the potential impacts of interim CRs. 

Interim CRs typically are intended to both (1) preserve congressional prerogatives to make final decisions on full-year funding levels and (2) prevent a funding gap and corresponding government shutdown. Consequently, interim CRs provide relatively restrictive funding levels for agencies and usually prohibit projects or activities that were not funded in the previous year (sometimes called "new starts"). Interim CRs also impose some paperwork burden on federal agencies. Two other potential impacts might be identified. First, the restrictive funding level of an interim CR may impact upon an agency's activities, compared to the situation of receiving fullyear appropriations. For example, agency personnel may reduce or delay a variety of actions, including hiring, award of contracts, and travel. Second, an agency funded by an interim CR may experience some uncertainty about what its final funding level will be. Uncertainty may cause an agency to alter its operations, rates of spending, and spending patterns over time, with potential ripple effects for internal management of the agency and its programmatic activities. Whether any potential impacts manifest themselves in actual cases would depend on specific circumstances, including how the interim CR is crafted, the time of year, and an agency's or program's particular operations. OMB and agency documents, as well as Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports, provide additional perspectives on potential impacts of interim CRs. 

Related issues for Congress may include use of anomalies to manage impacts, congressional access to information and views from agencies and their employees, and the assumptions that are used when assessing potential impacts. 

More extensive analysis on this subject is available in CRS Congressional Distribution Memorandum, Potential Impacts of Interim Continuing Resolutions (CRs) on Agency Operations and the Functioning of the Federal Government, coordinated by Clinton T. Brass (available on request).


Date of Report: March 16, 2010
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Misuse of Government Purchase Cards

Garrett Hatch
Analyst in American National Government

Since the mid-1990s, the use of government purchase cards has expanded at a rapid rate. Spurred by legislative and regulatory reforms designed to increase the use of purchase cards for small acquisitions, the dollar volume of government purchase card transactions grew from $527 million in FY1993, to $19.3 billion in FY2009. While the use of purchase cards has been credited with reducing administrative costs, audits of agency purchase card programs have found varying degrees of waste, fraud, and abuse. One of the most common risk factors cited by auditors is a weak internal control environment: many agencies have failed to implement adequate safeguards against card misuse, even as their purchase card programs grew. 

In response to these findings, Congress has held hearings and introduced legislation that would enhance the management and oversight of agency purchase card programs. One of the most comprehensive proposals in recent years is the Government Credit Card Abuse Prevention Act of 2009. Drawing on GAO recommendations, the bill would require agencies, other than the Department of Defense (DOD), to implement a specific set of internal controls, establish penalties for employees who misuse agency purchase cards, and conduct periodic risk assessments and audits of agency purchase card programs. DOD would be required to expand its use of technology to prevent and identify fraudulent purchases, conduct periodic risk assessments and audits, and develop more specific rules regarding card deactivation of former DOD employees. 

This report begins by providing background on agency purchase card programs. It then discusses identified weaknesses in agency purchase card controls that have contributed to card misuse, and examines legislation introduced in the 111th Congress that would address these weaknesses.


Date of Report: March 16, 2010
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Supreme Court Nominations Not Confirmed, 1789-2009

Henry B. Hogue
Analyst in American National Government

Of the 159 nominations to the Supreme Court of the United States from 1789 through 2009, 36 were not confirmed by the Senate. The 36 nominations represent 31 individuals whose names were sent forward to the Senate by Presidents (some individuals were nominated more than once). Of the 31 individuals who were not confirmed the first time they were nominated, however, six were later nominated again and confirmed. The Supreme Court nominations discussed here were not confirmed for a variety of reasons, including Senate opposition to the nominating President, nominee's views, or incumbent Court; senatorial courtesy; perceived political unreliability of the nominee; perceived lack of ability; interest group opposition; and fear of altering the balance of the Court. The Senate Committee on the Judiciary has played an important role in the confirmation process, particularly since 1868. 

All but the most recent of these nominations have been the subject of extensive legal, historical, and political science writing, a selected list of which is included in this report.


Date of Report: March 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 29
Order Number: RL31171
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Legislative Procedure in Congress: Basic Sources for Congressional Staff

Jennifer E. Manning
Information Research Specialist

Written for congressional staff, this report identifies and provides website addresses (when available) of official government sources for information on the legislative process and the rules and procedure of the House and Senate. References to selected CRS products are also provided, as well as a listing of selected titles for supplementary reading. Information is offered on the CRS legislative institutes.


Date of Report: March 16, 2010
Number of Pages: 9
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Campaign Finance Policy After Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission: Issues and Options for Congress

R. Sam Garrett
Analyst in American National Government

Following the Supreme Court's January 21, 2010, ruling in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, questions have emerged about which policy options could be available to Congress. This report provides an overview of selected campaign finance policy options that may be relevant. It also briefly comments on how Citizens United might affect political advertising. A complete understanding of how Citizens United will affect the campaign and policy environments is likely to be unavailable until at least the conclusion of the 2010 election cycle. 

As Congress considers legislative responses, at least two broad choices could be relevant. First, Congress could provide candidates or parties with additional access to funds to combat corporate influence in elections. Second, Congress could restrict spending under certain conditions or require those making expenditures post-Citizens United to provide additional information to voters or regulators. Options within both approaches could generate substantial debate. Some may contend that the only way to provide Congress with the power to directly affect the content of the ruling would be to amend the Constitution. 

Almost 40 bills introduced during the 111th Congress may be relevant for legislative responses to Citizens United. These include, but are not necessarily limited to, H.Con.Res. 13, H.J.Res. 13, H.J.Res. 68, H.J.Res. 74, H.R. 158, H.R. 1095, H.R. 1826, H.R. 2038, H.R. 2056, H.R. 3574, H.R. 3859, H.R. 4431, H.R. 4432, H.R. 4433, H.R. 4434, H.R. 4435, H.R. 4487, H.R. 4510, H.R. 4511, H.R. 4517, H.R. 4522, H.R. 4523, H.R. 4527, H.R. 4537, H.R. 4540, H.R. 4550, H.R. 4583, H.R. 4617, H.R. 4630, H.R. 4644, H.R. 4749, H.R. 4768, H.R. 4790, S.J.Res. 28, S. 133, S. 752, S. 2954, S. 2959, and S. 3004. Given the pace of developments since the ruling, this report is not intended to be exhaustive. Relevant legislation that has been introduced thus far is reflected through selected examples and in Table 1 at the end of this report. Additional legislation will be included in future updates. 

This report is not intended to provide a legal analysis of Citizens United or of constitutional issues that might affect the policy options discussed here. CRS Report R41045, The Constitutionality of Regulating Corporate Expenditures: A Brief Analysis of the Supreme Court Ruling in Citizens United v. FEC, by L. Paige Whitaker, and CRS Report R41096, Legislative Options After Citizens United v. FEC: Constitutional and Legal Issues, by L. Paige Whitaker et al., discuss legal and constitutional issues.

 

Date of Report: March 15, 2010
Number of Pages: 21
Order Number: R41054
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Congressional Review Act: Rules Not Submitted to GAO and Congress

Curtis W. Copeland
Specialist in American National Government

The Congressional Review Act (CRA; 5 U.S.C. §§801-808) was enacted to improve congressional authority over agency rulemaking, and requires federal agencies to submit all of their final rules to both houses of Congress and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) before they can take effect. GAO periodically compares the list of rules that are submitted to it with the rules that are published in the Federal Register to determine whether any covered rules have not been submitted. 

Between 1999 and 2009, GAO sent the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) within the Office of Management and Budget at least five letters listing more than 1,000 substantive final rules that GAO said it had not received. In each of those letters, GAO encouraged OIRA to use the information to ensure that the agencies complied with the CRA. The May 2009 letter listed 101 substantive rules that were published during FY2008 that GAO said had not been submitted. The missing rules were issued by different agencies, including the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Transportation, and Homeland Security. The topics covered by these rules varied, and included chemical facility anti-terrorism standards, designation of critical habitats for endangered species, the administration of direct farm loan programs, oil and gas lease operations, and changes to workplace drug and alcohol programs. As of October 26, 2009, 99 of the 101 rules had still not been submitted to GAO and to both houses of Congress. OIRA sent an e-mail to federal agencies in November 2009 telling them to contact GAO regarding these missing rules. In the following week, several of the rules were submitted to GAO, and more than a dozen other rules were submitted in the following month. Also, CRS determined that 22 significant rules that were published in the Federal Register between October 2008 and July 2009 were not listed in GAO's database as of mid-November 2009. On January 19, 2010, GAO sent OIRA a letter listing 31 substantive rules that were published during FY2009 that had not been submitted to GAO. OIRA subsequently sent another e-mail to the agencies reminding them of their CRA responsibilities and said it planned to provide GAO with a list of agency contacts. As of March 15, 2010, all but 4 of the 31 missing rules had been submitted. 

H.R. 2247, which was passed by the House of Representatives on June 16, 2009, and is currently before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security, would amend the CRA and eliminate the requirement that federal agencies submit their rules to Congress before they can take effect. The rules would still have to be submitted to GAO, and GAO would be required to submit to each house of Congress a weekly report containing a list of the rules received. 

Congress may conclude that enactment of this legislation will improve agencies' ability and willingness to submit their covered rules, or that this is an administrative issue that should be resolved between GAO, OIRA, and the rulemaking agencies. Alternatively, Congress could require OIRA or GAO to take additional actions to ensure compliance with the CRA's reporting requirements. Congress could also require GAO to provide a copy of its CRA compliance reports to Congress, publish the reports in the Federal Register, or both.


Date of Report: March 16, 2010
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Access to Government Information In the United States

Wendy R. Ginsberg
Analyst in Government Organization and Management

The U.S. Constitution makes no specific allowance for any one of the three branches of the federal government to have access to information held by the others. No provision in the U.S. Constitution expressly establishes a procedure for public access to government information. 

Congress has legislated various public access laws. Among these laws are two records access statutes, 

• the Freedom of Information Act (FOI Act or FOIA; 5 U.S.C. § 552), and 

• the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a), 

and two meetings access statutes, 

• the Federal Advisory Committee Act (FACA; 5 U.S.C. App.), and 

• the Government in the Sunshine Act (5 U.S.C. § 552b). 

The American separation of powers model of government may inherently prompt interbranch conflicts over the accessibility of information. These conflicts are neither unexpected nor necessarily destructive. Although there is considerable interbranch cooperation in the sharing of information and records, such conflicts over access may continue on occasion. 

This report offers an overview of the four information access laws noted above, and provides citations to additional resources related to these tools.


Date of Report: March 16, 2010
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